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  Abstract 
Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be 
susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we ask whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many 
other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirms previous research showing an 
effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four 
further experiments, we then explored the effect of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments 
obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast anchors had no effect 
on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect in metamemory control (restudy choices) in 
Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn 
affects metamemory control. The current research reveals that informative and, more importantly, 
uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. Based 
on the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these 
results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.  
Keywords: anchoring; informative; uninformative; metamemory monitoring; metamemory control  
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A large body of previous studies have shown that people’s metamemory monitoring (that is, 
metacognitive judgments about memory) can often be relatively accurate (for a review, see Rhodes, 
2016). For example, people predict that difficult items are less likely to be remembered, and their 
predictions about their future memory performance are positively correlated with their actual test 
performance (Scheck, Meeter, & Nelson, 2004; Yang, Potts, & Shanks, 2017a, 2017b; Yang & 
Shanks, 2017). Nonetheless, recent research has revealed that a range of factors may bias people’s 
metamemory monitoring. For instance, although the font size of study words has no effect on later 
recall, people give higher judgements of learning (JOLs, the judged likelihood that a given item will 
be remembered at a later test) to large than to small font size words (Hu et al., 2015; Hu, Liu, Li, & 
Luo, 2016; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Yang, Huang, & Shanks, submitted). Although loudness has no 
effect on memory retention, people give higher JOLs to loud than to quiet words (Rhodes & Castel, 
2009). Finn (2008) found a framing effect in metamemory monitoring: People give higher memory 
performance predictions when they are asked to predict the likelihood they will remember a given 
item than when they are asked to predict the likelihood they will forget the item, although the frame 
has no effect on actual recall. 
Besides miscalibration of metamemory monitoring, people’s metamemory control (that is, 
strategic choices such as restudy decisions and study time allocation) is intimately related to 
metamemory monitoring (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Rhodes & Castel, 2009; Yang et al., 2017b), and 
miscalibrated metamemory monitoring often leads to inefficient metamemory control (Kornell & 
Bjork, 2008b; Soderstrom & Bjork, 2014; Yang et al., 2017b). If a learner believes, for instance, that 
massed learning is more effective than spaced learning (metamemory monitoring) (Kornell & Bjork, 
2008a; Yan, Bjork, & Bjork, 2016), she is likely to structure her learning in an inefficient way by 
exposing herself to massed rather than spaced materials (metamemory control) (Tauber, Dunlosky, 
Rawson, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2013). Therefore, how people monitor their learning is a critical 
question for learners, educators, and psychologists, and understanding the processes involved in 
metamemory monitoring is central in understanding metamemory control. 
Theories of metamemory monitoring 
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Although metamemory monitoring has been extensively explored for over 50 years (Hart, 
1965), the underlying causal mechanisms are still unclear. There is substantial evidence that people’s 
beliefs affect their JOLs (Hu et al., 2015; Mueller & Dunlosky, 2017; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & 
Rhodes, 2014). Hu et al. (2015), for instance, found that people hold a priori beliefs that large words 
are more memorable than small words and they incorporate these beliefs into the judgment process. 
Another possible cue is processing fluency: Fluent processing experience produces a feeling of 
knowing, which can form a basis for JOLs (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2014; Undorf, Zimdahl, & Bernstein, 
2017; Yang et al., submitted). For example, Yang et al. (submitted) found that perceptual fluency 
during encoding affects JOLs, and Undorf and Erdfelder (2014) found that conceptual fluency affects 
JOLs as well. These findings, jointly, support a dual-process theory which proposes that people’s 
JOLs are based on both processing fluency and beliefs about remembering difficulty. However, other 
studies have found that, in some situations, processing fluency is unlikely to contribute to JOLs 
(Susser, Jin, & Mulligan, 2016; Witherby & Tauber, 2017). Therefore, Mueller, Dunlosky, and 
Tauber (2016) proposed an analytic-processing theory, which hypothesizes that people’s beliefs about 
remembering difficulty play the major role in constructing JOLs and that processing fluency plays a 
less important or even no role (for detailed description and comparison of the dual-process and 
analytic-processing theories, see Mueller & Dunlosky, 2017, p. 246). 
Different from both the dual-process and analytic-processing theories, which focus on the 
roles of people’s beliefs and/or processing fluency, a cue-utilization theory postulates that JOLs are 
based on a set of different cues or heuristics (Koriat, 1997, p. 350 - 352). This theory highlights that, 
when making a JOL, people search for and incorporate a variety of diagnostic cues/heuristics to 
reduce prediction uncertainty and to reach a reasonable judgment. Specifically, this theory 
hypothesizes that three kinds of heuristics contribute to JOLs: intrinsic heuristics (natural 
characteristics of the study items; e.g., semantic relatedness of word pairs), extrinsic heuristics (the 
conditions of learning; e.g., study times, study methods), and mnemonic heuristics (subjective 
processing experiences; e.g., processing fluency, cue familiarity). 
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Below, we consider how these theories might accommodate the effects of numerical anchors 
on judgments of learning and on metamemory control. 
Anchoring effects and underlying mechanisms  
The anchoring effect refers to the fact that numeric judgments tend to assimilate towards 
previously encountered numerical anchors. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) first asked 
participants to judge whether the proportion of African nations in the UN is higher or lower than an 
arbitrary anchor (high anchor: 65%; low anchor: 10%). Then all participants made an absolute 
estimate. Those who encountered the high anchor gave higher estimates (45%) than those who 
encountered the low anchor (15%). The anchoring effect, which has been explored for decades 
(Slovic, 1967), is a pervasive judgment bias, evident for example in legal judgments (Englich, 
Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006), willingness-to-pay and -accept in purchasing (Simonson & Drolet, 
2004), negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), work performance ratings (Thorsteinson, Breier, 
Atwell, Hamilton, & Privette, 2008), and judgments of confidence (S. R. Carroll, Petrusic, & Leth-
Steensen, 2009) (for reviews, see Furnham & Boo, 2011; Newell & Shanks, 2014).   
It is widely assumed that anchoring can be caused by several different mechanisms – there is 
not just a single “anchoring effect”, but several (S. R. Carroll et al., 2009; Furnham & Boo, 2011; 
Newell & Shanks, 2014). There are two particularly popular proposals. The first is the confirmatory 
hypothesis testing or selective accessibility theory (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 
1997). This hypothesizes that encountering an anchor induces people to construct a mental model in 
which the target property is aligned with the anchor, and then test whether the anchor is the possible 
target property. Some supporting evidence for selective accessibility comes from a study by 
Mussweiler and Strack (2000). In their Experiment 2, Mussweiler and Strack (2000) asked 
participants to indicate whether a German car costs more or less than €40,000 (high anchor) or 
€20,000 (low anchor). The selective accessibility theory assumes that the anchor semantically 
activates features of the target that are consistent with it. Thus in the presence of a high anchor, for 
example, features such as leather upholstery and a powerful engine will be activated. When 
subsequently asked to judge the car’s cost, these activated features serve to bias participants’ 
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estimates upwards. To test the theory, Mussweiler and Strack asked their participants to complete a 
lexical decision task to measure attribute activation following the comparative question but prior to 
making their absolute judgment. They found that the high anchor group responded faster to words 
associated with expensive cars (e.g., Mercedes) than to words associated with inexpensive cars (e.g., 
Golf), whereas the low anchor group showed the reverse pattern. These results imply that, consistent 
with the selective accessibility theory, anchors semantically activate consistent features of the target. 
The second is the scale distortion theory, recently proposed by Frederick and Mochon (2012). 
They suggested that the anchoring effect is triggered by a distortion of the psychological scale. This 
theory is based on the contrast effect (e.g., warm water is perceived to be warmer if people have 
previously placed their hand in cold water). Imagine that people think that 35% is a reasonable 
estimate of the proportion of African countries in the UN when no anchor is shown. A low anchor 
(10%) causes 35% to appear much larger than it otherwise would, which in turn leads people to give 
estimates lower than 35% and assimilate to the low anchor. In contrast, a high anchor (65%) makes 
35% appear small, and then leads to estimates higher than 35% and assimilation to the high anchor. In 
summary, the selective accessibility theory postulates that anchors activate cues consistent with them 
and change the mental representation of the target property. In contrast, the scale distortion theory 
hypothesizes that anchors do not affect the representation of the target property, but only the 
psychological interpretation of the response scale. 
Anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring 
It is surprising that little research has been conducted to directly explore the anchoring effect 
in metamemory monitoring, as any detectable effects of anchors may provide important insight into 
the processes that underlie metacognitive judgments. One possible reason for this lacuna is that 
researchers tend to treat metacognition and judgment and decision making (JDM) research as distinct. 
The current research is designed to bridge these lines of research by investigating the anchoring effect 
in metamemory monitoring. Specifically, we asked whether metamemory monitoring, like other kinds 
of metacognitive judgments, is susceptible to anchors. 
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Many previous studies have proposed that the anchoring effect may account for some 
metamemory illusions (i.e., disparities between JOLs and actual memory performance). For example, 
Scheck et al. (2004) and Finn and Metcalfe (2007) proposed that anchoring helps to explain the 
underconfidence with practice effect (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002). Koriat (1997) instructed 
participants to study some word pairs across two study-test cycles. In the first cycle, participants 
studied each pair for 5 sec and made a JOL to predict the likelihood that they would remember the 
pair, and then took a test on all pairs. In the second cycle, participants restudied all pairs, again made 
item-by-item JOLs, and took a final recall test. Koriat (1997) found a relatively good degree of 
agreement between participants’ JOLs and recall in the first cycle. Nonetheless, in the second cycle 
participants showed an underconfidence with practice effect: their JOLs were significantly lower than 
their recall. Finn and Metcalfe (2007) and Scheck et al. (2004) proposed that JOLs in the second cycle 
were heavily based on test performance in the first cycle. Participants performed poorly in the first 
cycle, which set a low performance anchor. The additional exposure (restudy opportunities) in the 
second cycle significantly enhanced subsequent test performance, but participants’ JOLs in the second 
cycle were biased by previous test performance (anchors) and therefore JOLs were insufficient to 
reflect the true level of recall improvement.  
Scheck et al. (2004) further proposed that anchoring can account for insensitivity of 
metamemory judgments to recall difficulty. They found that both participants’ recall and JOLs 
increased as recall became easier, but that JOLs increased more gradually than recall. Scheck et al. 
(2004) proposed that participants might base their JOLs on their beliefs about the proportion of items 
they can usually remember (e.g., 50%) (M. Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 1997), and this “anchor” then 
biased their JOLs. Anchoring has been proposed as a possible cause of other metamemory illusions 
(e.g., Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; Yang et al., 2017b).  
The anchoring effect proposed as an explanation of the underconfidence with practice effect 
makes reference to an internal performance estimate as the anchor, while the effect proposed as an 
explanation of insensitivity of metamemory judgments to recall difficulty makes reference to people’s 
beliefs about the proportion of items they can usually remember as the self-generated anchor. 
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Establishing a causal influence of these anchors in judgments is difficult because in the experimental 
procedures the experimenter cannot directly manipulate the anchor value. Only a handful of studies 
have explored the possibility that external numerical anchors might causally influence metamemory 
judgments.  
Zhao and Linderholm (2011) and Zhao (2012) asked two groups of participants to study some 
texts. Participants then received an anchor instruction. In a high anchor group, participants were told 
that “Based on a previous study, college students’ test performance ranged from 90% to 100%, with a 
mean of 95%”. In a low anchor group, in contrast, participants were told that “Based on a previous 
study, college students’ test performance ranged from 50% to 60%, with a mean of 55%.” Then 
participants were asked to make a JOL to predict their future test performance. Zhao and colleagues 
found that JOLs in the high anchor group were on average higher than those in the low anchor group, 
whereas there was no difference in recall between groups. A similar finding was obtained by England 
and Serra (2012) using word pair stimuli and with JOLs made on each pair. Overall, these three 
studies clearly found anchoring effects in metamemory monitoring. However, one important question 
has yet to be explored. 
Motivation of the current research 
All three previous studies (England & Serra, 2012; Zhao, 2012; Zhao & Linderholm, 2011) 
investigated the effect of informative anchors in metamemory monitoring. Prior to making their JOLs, 
participants were explicitly told about past peer performance. The fact that past peer performance 
(high/low) affects JOLs can be explained in terms of rational inference: If the experimenter is 
informing the learner that in a relevant cohort of other participants, certain materials proved easy or 
difficult to learn, then any rational (Bayesian) learner will incorporate that information into their 
JOLs. Previous studies have not asked whether uninformative anchors, which a rational judge should 
ignore, can similarly influence people’s metamemory monitoring. Therefore, the primary aim of the 
current research is to explore this question. 
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Would we expect metamemory monitoring to be susceptible to uninformative anchors? A 
voluminous literature has established that the anchoring effect is a pervasive phenomenon across 
judgment domains (Furnham & Boo, 2011). Intuitively, we would thus expect that metamemory 
monitoring would be susceptible to anchoring. Indeed, the scale distortion theory of the anchoring 
effect straightforwardly predicts that JOLs will be biased by uninformative anchors: Anchors should 
distort the uses of the response scale and JOLs should assimilate to them. In addition, the selective 
accessibility theory of the anchoring effect and the cue-utilization theory of metamemory monitoring 
may combine to predict an anchoring effect: Uninformative anchors induce people to search for cues 
to test whether the anchor is the possible target property (selective accessibility) and then people may 
use these cues to form their JOLs (cue-utilization). 
However, two metamemory theories (the dual-process and analytic-processing theories) 
predict no such effect. First, uninformative anchors cannot affect processing fluency because they are 
always presented after the target item. Second, there is little reason to expect that people have a priori 
beliefs that uninformative anchors correlate with memory, or develop such beliefs on-line across a 
study phase, because, in our Experiments 3B and 4, the anchors are randomly selected by participants 
and completely uninformative. Therefore, both the dual-process and analytic-processing theories 
predict no effect of uninformative anchors on JOLs. Thus the theories reviewed above make different 
predictions about the effects of uninformative anchors on metamemory monitoring. Although the 
current research was designed to empirically explore the anchoring effect on metamemory 
monitoring, it also has theoretical implications which we return to in the General Discussion. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to conceptually replicate the effect of informative anchors on 
metamemory monitoring (England & Serra, 2012; Zhao, 2012; Zhao & Linderholm, 2011). 
Method 
Participants 
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Given that no previous research has explored the anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring 
in a within-subjects design, we assumed that the difference in JOLs between high and low anchor 
pairs would be a medium-sized (Cohen’s d = 0.50) effect. Based on this estimate, we computed the 
required sample size using the G*Power program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), which 
showed that the required sample size to observe a significant (α = .05) difference in JOLs at 0.8 power 
was 35. Forty participants with an average age of 20.18 years (SD = 1.38), 31 females, were recruited 
from Fuqing Branch of Fujian Normal University. They took part in the experiment for course credit. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
The stimuli were fifty weakly associated Chinese word pairs developed by Hu et al. (2016). 
These 50 pairs were separated into five sets, one for each block of the study phase. Assignment of sets 
to each block was counterbalanced across participants using a Latin square design. In each block, for 
each participant, five pairs were randomly selected by the computer as high anchor pairs and the 
remainder as low anchor pairs.  
The experiment employed a within-subjects design (anchor: low/high). Participants were 
informed that after studying each pair they would be asked to predict the likelihood that they would 
remember that pair in 5 min. In addition, they were told that, to improve their prediction accuracy, the 
computer would tell them what proportion of individuals were able to remember that pair in our 
previous studies. Participants were informed that they would be asked to recall the second (target) in 
response to the first (cue) words at the final test. 
The main task consisted of three phases: encoding, distraction, and test. In the encoding 
phase, each of the 10 pairs in each block was randomly presented, one by one, for 5 sec. Blocks were 
not marked in any way to participants. After studying each pair, that word pair disappeared and an 
anchor instruction was shown at the upper centre of the screen. For the high anchor pairs, the anchor 
instruction was “According to our previous studies, about 90% of individuals could remember this 
pair in 5 min”. For the low anchor pairs, the anchor instruction was “According to our previous 
studies, about 10% of individuals could remember this pair in 5 min”. Participants were asked to 
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make a JOL to predict the likelihood that they would remember that pair in 5 min. JOLs were made 
on a slider displayed at the middle of the screen, labeled from 0 (I’m sure I’ll not remember it) to 100 
(I’ll definitely remember it) and responses were self-paced. Following the encoding phase, a 
distraction task (solving math problems for five min) was administered. Finally, participants took a 
cued recall test on all 50 pairs. In the test, all 50 cue words were randomly presented, one at a time. 
Participants attempted to recall the corresponding targets and enter them via the keyboard. There was 
no feedback in the test.  
Results  
Figure 1 depicts recall and JOLs for low and high anchor pairs. There was no difference in 
final recall between high (M = 40.3%, SD = 19.84) and low (M = 38.9%, SD = 20.01) anchor pairs, 
proportion difference = 1.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [-4.19, 6.89], Cohen’s d = 0.08 (Faul et 
al., 2007; Morris & DeShon, 2002). In contrast, higher JOLs were given to high (M = 61.3, SD = 
19.45) than to low anchor pairs (M = 54.1, SD = 19.31), difference = 7.25, 95% CI = [2.83, 11.67], 
Cohen’s d = 0.52, indicating an effect of informative anchors on metamemory monitoring. Twenty-
nine participants gave higher JOLs to high anchor pairs while eleven showed the reverse pattern. We 
calculated a Gamma correlation value between JOLs and recall for each participant, and used Fisher’s 
Z transformation in this and all subsequent experiments to calculate an estimate of the mean 
correlation (Silver & Dunlap, 1987). There was a significantly positive correlation between JOLs and 
recall (see Table 1). Thus over and above the effect of the anchors, participants were able to some 
extent to accurately report their likelihood of correct recall. 
Discussion 
There was a significant effect of informative anchors on metamemory monitoring when 
anchors were manipulated within-subjects. In contrast, the anchors did not affect recall itself. This 
latter result reveals a sharp dissociation between metamemory judgments and memory. It is important 
to emphasize that an anchoring effect on recall could easily be anticipated. Suppose that a participant, 
shown a low anchor, makes a correspondingly low JOL. On the basis of that judgment she could then 
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allocate more attention and effort to rehearsing that word pair than she would to a word pair 
associated with a high anchor, leading to better final recall for the low anchor items. We explore the 
relationship between metamemory monitoring and control in Experiment 4. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we found an effect of informative anchors on metamemory monitoring. As 
discussed above, rational participants might explicitly integrate the value of an informative anchor 
(e.g., past peer performance) with their judgment about the difficulty of remembering the current 
word pair to generate their JOL. In Experiment 2, we explored the effect of uninformative anchors on 
metamemory monitoring, where such integration would not be rationally justifiable in this way. The 
classic paradigm for exploring the effect of uninformative anchors on judgments involves a 
comparative question (i.e., whether a target value is greater or smaller than an anchor value) prior to 
an absolute estimate of the target value. For example, Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) asked 
participants whether the length of Mississippi River is longer or shorter than 2000 (high anchor) or 70 
miles (low anchor) before asking them to estimate the length of the Mississippi River. Following this 




The sample size was determined according to a power analysis based on the results of 
Experiment 1. The sample size to observe a significant (α = .05) difference in JOLs between high and 
low anchor pairs at 0.8 power was 32 participants. Data from two participants were lost due to 
computer failure, leaving data from 30 participants. All participants were undergraduates from Fuqing 
Branch of Fujian Normal University, with an average age of 19.93 years (SD = 1.74), 21 females. 
They took part for course credit. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
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Forty-eight word pairs from Experiment 1 were employed and were randomly divided into 4 
sets each comprising twelve pairs. Assignment of sets to each block was counterbalanced across 
participants. Again, anchor (low/high) was manipulated within-subjects. Unlike in Experiment 1, we 
changed the anchor values to decrease their informativeness. Low anchors consisted of the numbers 
10%, 20%, and 30%, whereas high anchors consisted of the numbers 70%, 80%, and 90%. In each 
block, for each participant, two of the 12 word pairs were randomly selected and were assigned to 
each anchor value. 
The procedure was same as that in Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. After 
studying each pair, participants were asked “Is the likelihood you would be able to remember the 
preceding word pair in 5 min higher or lower than [10%/20%/30%/70%/80%/90%]?” Then they were 
asked to predict the likelihood that they would be able to remember the pair in 5 min by dragging and 
clicking a scale ranging from 0 to 100. 
Results and discussion 
Again, we found a significant anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring. Participants gave 
significantly higher JOLs to high (M = 66.99, SD = 16.60) than to low anchor pairs (M = 62.48, SD = 
20.44), difference = 4.51, 95% CI = [1.52, 7.50], Cohen’s d = 0.56 (see Figure 2). Nineteen 
participants gave higher JOLs to high anchor pairs while 11 showed the reverse pattern. Yet there was 
no difference in recall itself between high (M = 43.1%, SD = 21.42) and low anchor (M = 43.3%, SD 
= 24.94) pairs, difference = -0.3%, 95% CI = [-6.80, 6.24], Cohen’s d = -0.02. There was again a 
positive correlation between JOLs and recall (see Table 1) revealing some evidence of metacognitive 
accuracy, aside from the anchoring effect. 
Experiment 3A 
In Experiment 2 there was a significant effect of uninformative anchors in metamemory 
monitoring. However, although the comparative questions simply presented a number against which 
participants compared their estimate, it is possible that they were interpreted as informative. For 
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example, participants might think that a low anchor implied that the preceding pair was a difficult 
pair. 
Previous studies exploring the effect of uninformative anchors have asked participants to 
randomly select anchor values themselves to emphasize their lack of relevance to the judgment 
question. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked participants to randomly select a number 
(65 or 10) by spinning a wheel of fortune, and then asked participants to judge whether the proportion 
of African countries in the UN is higher or lower than 65% or 10%. Following Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974), in Experiment 3A we instructed participants to randomly select a number and then 
to report whether the likelihood they would remember a given word pair was higher or lower than the 
number they selected. In this way, we explore whether there is an effect of uninformative anchors on 
metamemory monitoring when people believe the anchors are randomly selected. Chapman and 
Johnson (1999) noted that the anchors might be interpreted as non-random and hence informative in 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) study, because there were only two numbers (65 and 10) on the 
fortune wheel. We therefore employed nine anchor values (10%, 20%, 30%.... 90%).  
Method 
Participants 
The sample size was determined according to a power analysis of the results of Experiment 2. 
The sample size to observe a significant (α = .05) difference in JOLs between high and low anchor 
pairs at 0.8 power was 28 participants. In total we recruited 28 participants, with an average age of 
20.89 years (SD = 1.20), 22 females, from Fuqing Branch of Fujian Normal University. They 
participated for course credit. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
Forty-five word pairs from the previous experiments were chosen and randomly divided into 
5 sets, each consisting of nine pairs. Assignment of sets to each block was counterbalanced across 
participants. For each participant, in each block, a pair was randomly assigned to an anchor. Low 
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anchors were 10%, 20%, and 30%, medium anchors 40%, 50%, and 60%, and high anchors 70%, 
80%, and 90%. 
The procedure was same as that in Experiment 2 with the following exceptions. After 
studying each pair, a box appeared on the screen containing rapidly changing numbers (10%, 20% ..... 
90%), randomly generated and displayed superimposed for 20 ms each. Participants were asked to 
press the ‘b’ key to select a number. After the keypress, the anchor number assigned to that pair was 
shown on the screen and participants were asked “Is the likelihood you would remember the 
preceding word pair in 5 min higher or lower than [10%/20%/30%/ … 90%]?” Then participants were 
asked to predict the likelihood they would be able to remember the preceding pair in 5 min by 
dragging and clicking a scale ranging from 0 to 100.  
We instructed participants to randomly select a number, but in fact, the anchor number was 
decided by the computer. In this way, we ensured that in each block there was one word pair assigned 
to each anchor value. We hypothesized that because numbers changed very rapidly (50 per sec), 
participants would not realize that the anchor number was chosen independently of their action. 
Results 
There was no main effect of uninformative anchors on recall, F(2, 54) = 0.10, p = .91, ηp² 
< .01, in a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with anchor value (low/medium/high) as 
the factor. In contrast, we found that JOLs linearly decreased across high, medium, and low anchor 
pairs, F(1, 27) = 18.87, p < .001, ηp² = .41 (see Figure 3A). Participants gave significantly higher 
JOLs to high (M = 55.80, SD = 16.47) than to low anchor pairs (M = 49.96, SD = 17.46), difference = 
5.83, 95% CI = [3.08, 8.59], Cohen’s d = 0.82. Twenty participants gave higher JOLs to high anchor 
pairs while eight showed the reverse pattern. Participants also gave higher JOLs to high than to 
medium anchor pairs (M = 52.44, SD = 16.63), difference = 3.35, 95% CI = [0.73, 5.97], Cohen’s d = 
0.50, and marginally higher JOLs to medium than to low anchor pairs, difference = 2.48, 95% CI = [-
0.24, 5.20], Cohen’s d = 0.35. To further explore the anchoring effect on metamemory monitoring, we 
ran a repeated measures ANOVA with anchor value (10%, 20% …, 90%) as a within-subjects 
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variable. The results indicated that JOLs linearly increased from low to high anchor pairs, F(1, 27) = 
16.85, p < .001, ηp² = .38 (see Figure 4B). There was again a positive correlation between JOLs and 
recall (see Table 1). 
Experiment 3B 
In Experiment 3A, the anchor assignment was randomly determined by the computer rather 
than by the participant. Although the changing pace of numbers (20 ms each) was very fast, it is 
conceivable that participants suspected that the anchors – as a result of being selected by the computer 
rather than by themselves – were in fact non-random, contrary to our intentions. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3B, we made a further change to reduce participants’ suspicion: The anchor numbers 
were truly selected by participants. 
To establish that the selected numbers continued to be random, we carried out a procedural 
check. Ten University College London (UCL) participants were recruited to determine whether they 
could select an anchor number under intentional instructions to do so. For each participant, there were 
45 trials. On each trial, constantly changing numbers (10%, 20%... or 90%) were randomly generated 
by the computer and presented on the display for 20 ms each in the same manner as in Experiment 
3A. Participants were encouraged to do their best to press the ‘b’ key in order to select only the target 
number 50%. The results showed that there was no difference between the average frequency that 
participants successfully caught 50% (M = 5.00, SD = 2.54) and the level expected by chance (5). 
Hence this procedure ensures that the anchor is both truly chosen by the participant, and random.  
Participants 
Based on the data from Experiment 3A, we required 26 participants to observe a significant 
anchoring effect (α = .05) on JOLs at 0.8 power. Data from two participants were lost due to computer 
failure leaving data from 24 participants. All participants were undergraduates from Fuqing Branch of 
Fujian Normal University, with an average age of 20.75 years (SD = 0.85), and 20 were female. They 
participated for course credit. 
Materials, design, and procedure 
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The materials, design, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 3A with one exception. 
After participants pressed the ‘b’ key, the number they selected was shown at the middle of the 
screen, and participants were asked whether or not the likelihood they would be able to remember the 
preceding pair was higher or lower than the number they selected. 
Results 
Consistent with Experiment 3A, there was no main effect of uninformative anchors in recall, 
F(2, 46) = 0.04, p = .96, ηp² < .01, but JOLs linearly decreased across high, medium, and low anchor 
pairs, F(1, 23) = 5.29, p = .03, ηp² = .19 (see Figure 3C). Participants gave significantly higher JOLs 
to high (M = 51.78, SD = 23.55) than to low anchor pairs (M = 47.66, SD = 24.27), difference = 4.13, 
95% CI = [0.42, 7.83], Cohen’s d = 0.47. Sixteen participants gave higher JOLs to high anchor pairs 
while eight showed the reverse pattern. Participants also gave numerically higher JOLs to high than to 
medium anchor pairs (M = 50.58, SD = 24.70), difference = 1.20, 95% CI = [-1.83, 4.23], Cohen’s d = 
0.28, and marginally higher JOLs to medium than to low anchor pairs, difference = 2.93, 95% CI = [-
0.11, 5.96], Cohen’s d = 0.41. A repeated measures ANOVA with all anchor values as a within-
subjects variable revealed that JOLs linearly increased from low to high anchor pairs, F(1, 23) = 8.63, 
p = .007, ηp² = .27 (see Figure 3D). There was again a positive correlation between JOLs and recall 
(see Table 1). 
Discussion 
Both Experiments 3A and 3B clearly reveal a significant effect of uninformative anchors on 
metamemory monitoring, regardless of whether or not the anchor values were truly selected by 
participants.  
Experiment 4 
Across Experiments 2-3B we obtained effects of uninformative anchors on metamemory 
monitoring. From a theoretical perspective, these effects could be explained by scale distortion 
(anchors bias the psychological interpretation of the JOL scale) or alternatively the selective 
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accessibility and cue-utilization theories may combine to explain them (anchors activate cues which in 
turn form the basis for JOLs). 
In Experiment 4, we asked whether anchoring has an effect on metamemory control (restudy 
choices). As noted by Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, and Bergus (2007), while the anchoring effect in 
metacognitive judgments has been established as a robust phenomenon, surprisingly little research has 
explored the effect in decisions (action choices). Brewer et al. (2007) conducted the first study to 
explore this. They asked HIV-positive patients to imagine that they were having sex with an HIV-
negative partner, and the condom broke during intercourse. Patients were then asked to answer either 
a high or a low anchor question: Would the risk of infection be higher or lower than 99% (high 
anchor) or 1% (low anchor)? (Note that these may have been interpreted as informative anchors). All 
patients were then asked to make their best estimates of the risk. Following the estimation, they made 
a choice whether to recommend their partner to take a treatment (e.g., see a doctor; have an HIV test) 
or not (e.g., do nothing; wait and see). Brewer et al.’s (2007) results showed a significant anchoring 
effect in the estimates of the risk of transmission: Patients in the high anchor group reported 
significantly higher estimates (64%) than those in the low anchor group (43%). However, anchoring 
had no effect on treatment choices: There was no difference in treatment choices between the high 
and low anchor groups. Brewer and colleagues suggested that their results supported the scale 
distortion theory (i.e., anchors affect the uses of the response scale but do not change the mental 
representation of the target property). 
Following Brewer et al. (2007), in Experiment 4 we asked participants to answer a 
comparative (anchor) question, then make a JOL, and then make a restudy choice. We used 
uninformative anchors. The scale distortion theory predicts an anchoring effect on JOLs but no effect 
on restudy choices because anchors (10%-90%) and restudy choices (YES/NO) are expressed on 
different scales (Frederick & Mochon, 2012). Another aim of Experiment 4 is to conceptually 
replicate Experiment 3B’s findings with a UK rather than Chinese sample. Experiment 4 was fully 
pre-registered at OSF (https://osf.io/d73a5/registrations/).  
Method 




The sample size was determined according to the results of Experiment 3B. To observe a 
significant anchoring effect in JOLs at 0.80 power, we required at least 31 participants. Therefore, 31 
participants, with an average age of 22.26 years (SD = 6.03), 21 females, were recruited from the 
UCL participant pool. They received £3 or course credit as compensation.  
Materials, design, and procedure 
Forty-five weakly associated English word pairs (e.g., family-doctor) were selected from the 
South Florida Free Association norms developed by D. L. Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998). 
The forward semantic association strength ranged from 0.010 to 0.020, and the backward strength was 
0. 
The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 3B with one exception. After 
making each JOL, participants were asked whether they wanted to restudy the preceding pair after 
seeing all 45 pairs. They were told that they would be able to restudy it after they saw all 45 word 
pairs if they selected YES. If they selected NO, it would not be shown again. In fact, no pairs were 
restudied prior to the final recall test, regardless of participants’ restudy choices. 
Results and discussion 
The study proceeded in accordance with the preregistration plan. Figure 4A depicts 
participants’ JOLs, restudy choices, and recall for low, medium, and high anchor pairs. There was no 
main effect of uninformative anchors on recall, F(2, 60) = 0.34, p = .72, ηp² = .01, but JOLs linearly 
decreased across high, medium, and low anchor pairs, F(1, 30) = 9.91, p = .004, ηp² = .25. Participants 
gave higher JOLs to high (M = 57.93, SD = 12.32) than to low anchor pairs (M = 52.26, SD = 15.06), 
difference = 5.67, 95% CI = [1.99, 9.35], Cohen’s d = 0.57. Twenty-two participants gave higher 
JOLs to high than to low anchor pairs while nine showed the reverse pattern. Participants also gave 
numerically higher JOLs to high than to medium anchor pairs (M = 56.50, SD = 12.10), difference = 
1.43, 95% CI = [-1.17, 4.03], Cohen’s d = 0.20, as well as higher JOLs to medium than to low anchor 
pairs, difference = 4.25, 95% CI = [0.96, 7.53], Cohen’s d = 0.47. 
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What was the effect of the anchors on restudy choices – the key novel question addressed in 
this experiment? These linearly increased across high, medium, and low anchor pairs, F(1, 30) = 
13.20, p = 0.001, ηp² = .31. Participants selected a higher proportion of low (M = 40.9, SD = 22.46) 
than of high anchor pairs for restudy (M = 31.6, SD = 23.14), difference = 9.2%, 95% CI = [4.04, 
14.13], Cohen’s d = 0.65. Twenty-three participants showed this pattern and five the reverse (two 
participants did not select any pairs for restudy and one participant selected all pairs for restudy). 
Participants also selected a numerically higher proportion of low than of medium anchor pairs (M = 
34.6, SD = 24.91) for restudy, difference = 6.3, 95% CI = [-0.33, 12.89], Cohen’s d = 0.35, and a 
numerically higher proportion of medium than of high anchor pairs, difference = 3.0, 95% CI = [-
2.39, 8.30], Cohen’s d = 0.20. 
To further explore the effect of uninformative anchors in metamemory monitoring, we ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with all anchor values as the independent variable and with JOLs as the 
dependent variable. The results indicated that JOLs linearly increased from low to high anchor pairs, 
F(1, 30) = 10.95, p = .002, ηp² = .27 (see Figure 4B). Next, for each participant and for each anchor 
value, we calculated the proportions of pairs that were selected for restudy (see Figure 4C), and ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with all anchor values as the independent variable and with restudy 
choices as the dependent variable (this analysis was not part of the pre-registration). The results 
indicated that restudy choices linearly decreased from low to high anchor pairs, F(1, 30) = 7.58, p 
= .01, ηp² = .20 (see Figure 4C).  
Next, we conducted a multilevel mediation analysis to explore whether the anchoring effect in 
metamemory control (restudy choices) is mediated by its effect in metamemory monitoring (JOLs) 
using the bmlm R program (Vuorre & Bolger, 2017) (this analysis was not part of the pre-
registration). The results showed that JOLs significantly mediated the anchoring effect in restudy 
choices, mediation effect parameter = -0.09, 95% CI = [-0.16, -0.03] (for detailed results of the 
mediation analysis, see Table 2). The anchoring effect in metamemory control is at least partly 
mediated by its effect on metamemory monitoring. There was a significantly positive correlation 
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between JOLs and recall, a significantly negative correlation between JOLs and restudy choices, and a 
significantly negative correlation between restudy choices and recall (see Table 1). 
General Discussion 
In the current research, we first explored the effect of informative anchors on metamemory 
monitoring. In Experiment 1, informing participants of past peer performance in a within-subjects 
design biased their subsequent JOLs. More importantly, we found a significant effect of 
uninformative anchors on metamemory monitoring across Experiments 2-4, even when the anchors 
were self-selected to emphasize their uninformativeness (Experiments 3B and 4). Furthermore, in 
Experiment 4, we explored the anchoring effect in metamemory control. A higher proportion of low 
anchor pairs were selected for restudy than high anchor pairs. These results indicate that metamemory 
control is more closely related to metamemory monitoring than it is to actual memory status (Metcalfe 
& Finn, 2008; Yang et al., 2017b): Participants chose to restudy items for which their JOLs were 
biased downwards by a low anchor, even though the anchor had no effect on their actual likelihood of 
recalling the item.  
We observed significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring but no significant 
effect on recall across all five experiments. To confirm this pattern, we conducted a repeated measures 
multivariate ANOVA with data type (JOLs versus recall) and anchor as within-subjects variables. To 
maximize the power to observe a significant interaction, we collapsed all high anchor and low anchor 
items (JOLs and recall) across the five experiments. Results for the medium anchor items were 
removed from this analysis because there were no medium anchors in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between anchor and data type, F(1, 152) = 17.29, p < .001, 
ηp² = .10. Paired t tests revealed a significant anchoring effect on JOLs, difference = 5.64, 95% CI = 
[4.02, 7.26], Cohen’s d = 0.56, but no effect on recall, difference = 0.03, 95% CI = [-2.50, 2.57], 
Cohen’s d = 0.002.  
Why did uninformative anchors affect metamemory monitoring? The dual-process and 
analytic-processing theories for metamemory monitoring have difficulty explaining this effect 
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because the anchor, which was presented after each target word pair in our procedure, could not have 
affected the fluency with which the word pair was processed, and participants were unlikely to hold a 
priori or develop on-line beliefs that uninformative anchors (randomly selected by themselves) 
correlated with successful recall.  
Our favored explanation for the effect is based on a combination of the selective accessibility 
and cue-utilization theories. These two theories dovetail readily to explain the anchoring effect in 
metamemory monitoring. Imagine that you have been asked to memorize the word pair pond-frog in 
the context of a low anchor (e.g., 10%). The anchor will induce you (on the selective accessibility 
theory) to consider features of this word pair that might confirm that you will only be about 10% 
likely to remember it on the later test. You might, for instance, try to generate other strongly related 
words (e.g., water, lake) and evaluate how likely they are to come to mind instead of frog at test given 
the cue pond (selective accessibility). When asked to make an absolute judgment (JOL), this feature 
(that the target has many strong and easily-accessed competitors) will induce you to give a lower 
judgment than would have been the case given a high anchor (cue-utilization). Future studies could 
test this proposal more directly. For example, following Mussweiler and Strack (2000), participants 
could be asked to judge whether a letter string (e.g., water) is a word or non-word (lexical decision) 
immediately after they study a word pair (e.g., pond-frog) and answer a comparative (anchor) 
question. The selective accessibility hypothesis would be supported if participants respond faster to 
cue-related words, like water, in the low than in the high anchor condition. 
These two theories can also be readily applied to the anchoring effect in restudy choices. Low 
anchors might induce people to generate strongly related competitors and to appreciate how easy it 
will be at test to recall competitors as the correct response. This would then serve as a cue when a 
restudy choice is made (i.e., choosing to restudy the pairs associated with strong competitors). 
It is important to note that the anchoring effect in restudy choices does not invalidate the scale 
distortion theory. A defender of this theory could argue that uninformative anchors firstly affect the 
use of the response scale and bias JOLs, and then that participants make their restudy decisions 
according to their own JOLs by selecting low-JOL items for restudy (Finn, 2008; Yang et al., 2017b). 
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Indeed, in Experiment 4, the multilevel mediation analysis revealed that the anchoring effect in 
restudy choices was significantly mediated by its effect on JOLs. In summary, the selective 
accessibility and cue-utilization theories combine to provide the best explanation of the effects of 
uninformative anchors in metamemory monitoring and control, but the scale distortion theory remains 
a viable alternative account. These theories are not mutually exclusive and might yield overlapping 
anchoring effects. We emphasize however that these theoretical inferences are tentative as the primary 
goal of the present research was to explore whether anchors affect metamemory monitoring.  
In the current and all previous studies exploring the anchoring effect in metamemory 
monitoring (England & Serra, 2012; Zhao, 2012; Zhao & Linderholm, 2011), participants’ attention 
was explicitly directed to the anchors to ensure they attended to them. It is unknown whether anchors 
can bias metamemory monitoring when people do not pay attention to anchors. Wilson, Houston, 
Etling, and Brekke (1996) proposed that anchoring only occurs when people pay attention to anchors. 
However, Critcher and Gilovich (2008) claimed that attention is not a necessary prerequisite for 
anchoring to occur. They asked participants to view images incidentally containing a high or a low 
anchor. In a high anchor picture, for instance, a fictitious linebacker wore a jersey with the number 94 
whereas in the low anchor picture, the number was 54. Then all participants estimated how likely it 
was that the linebacker would register a sack in a football game. Although participants were not 
required to attend to or consider the number on the jersey, they gave higher estimates in the high 
compared to the low anchor condition (numerical anchoring). Future research could usefully explore 
whether incidentally encountered numbers can affect metamemory monitoring. For example, 
following Critcher and Gilovich (2008), participants could be asked to remember some basketball 
players while viewing their photos one by one. In each photo, a player wears a jersey with a number 
ranging from 0 to 100. After viewing each photo, participants make a JOL to predict how confident 
they are that they could remember that player later. Such studies could explore whether incidentally 
encountered numbers can bias metamemory monitoring. 
 Across all five experiments reported here, we explored the anchoring effect in immediate 
JOLs (that is, JOLs made immediately following a study phase). Future research could usefully 
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explore the anchoring effect in delayed JOLs (that is, JOLs made with a time interval between study 
and judgment). It is well-known that delayed JOLs are more accurate and less susceptible to biases 
than immediate ones (T. O. Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Van Overschelde & Nelson, 2006; Yang et al., 
2017b). 
Many previous studies have explored factors (such as a prior beliefs), which exist before the 
encoding phase, that can affect metamemory monitoring (Hu et al., 2015; Jia et al., 2015; Mueller & 
Dunlosky, 2017; Mueller et al., 2016; Undorf & Erdfelder, 2014; Witherby & Tauber, 2017). In 
addition, other studies have shown that encoding phase variables (e.g., processing fluency) can affect 
metamemory monitoring as well (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013; Susser, Panitz, Buchin, & 
Mulligan, 2017; Undorf et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017b). Going beyond these previous studies, the 
current research shows that variations which occur following the encoding phase (but prior to making 
a JOL) can also affect metamemory monitoring. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current research shows that metamemory judgments, similar to many other 
forms of metacognitive judgments, are not immune to anchoring effects. Not only informative but 
also uninformative anchors can affect metamemory monitoring. Moreover, anchors also affect 
metamemory control through their effects on metamemory monitoring. The selective activation and 
cue-utilization theories in combination provide a plausible theoretical explanation of the anchoring 
effect in metamemory monitoring.  
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Table 1.    Gamma correlations across experiments. 
 Correlation values 95% CI 
Experiment 1   
JOLs × Recall .22 [.15, 30] 
Experiment 2   
JOLs × Recall .24 [.14, .33] 
Experiment 3A   
JOLs × Recall .27 [.18, .36] 
Experiment 3B   
JOLs × Recall .23 [.12, 34] 
Experiment 4   
JOLs × Recall .30 [.20, 39] 
JOLs × Restudy choices -.70 [-.80, -.58] 
Restudy choices × Recall -.39 [-.55, -.21] 
 
 
Table 2.   Multilevel mediation analysis results of Experiment 4. 
 b SE 95% CI 
    Total effect of anchors on restudy choices -0.10 0.05 [-0.21, 0] 
    Direct effect of anchors on restudy choices -0.02 0.04 [-0.10, 0.07] 
    Indirect effect of anchors on restudy choices through JOLs -0.09 0.03 [-0.16, -0.03] 
 
  





















Figure 1. Experiment 1. JOLs and recall for high and low anchor pairs. Error bars represent ± 1 standard 
error. 






















Figure 2. Experiment 2. JOLs and recall for high and low anchor pairs. Error bars represent ± 1 standard 
error. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 3. Panel A: JOLs and recall for high, medium, and low anchor pairs in Experiment 
3A. Panel B: JOLs across different anchor values in Experiment 3A. Panel C: JOLs and recall for high, 
medium, and low anchor pairs in Experiment 3B. Panel D: JOLs across different anchor values in 
Experiment 3B. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error. 





















































Figure 4. Experiment 4. Panel A: JOLs, restudy choices, and recall for high, medium, and low anchor 
pairs. Panel B: JOLs across different anchor values. Panel C: Restudy choices across different anchor 
values. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error. 
